3 research outputs found

    A decidable policy language for history-based transaction monitoring

    Full text link
    Online trading invariably involves dealings between strangers, so it is important for one party to be able to judge objectively the trustworthiness of the other. In such a setting, the decision to trust a user may sensibly be based on that user's past behaviour. We introduce a specification language based on linear temporal logic for expressing a policy for categorising the behaviour patterns of a user depending on its transaction history. We also present an algorithm for checking whether the transaction history obeys the stated policy. To be useful in a real setting, such a language should allow one to express realistic policies which may involve parameter quantification and quantitative or statistical patterns. We introduce several extensions of linear temporal logic to cater for such needs: a restricted form of universal and existential quantification; arbitrary computable functions and relations in the term language; and a "counting" quantifier for counting how many times a formula holds in the past. We then show that model checking a transaction history against a policy, which we call the history-based transaction monitoring problem, is PSPACE-complete in the size of the policy formula and the length of the history. The problem becomes decidable in polynomial time when the policies are fixed. We also consider the problem of transaction monitoring in the case where not all the parameters of actions are observable. We formulate two such "partial observability" monitoring problems, and show their decidability under certain restrictions

    An Improved Reference Flow Control Model for Policy-Based Intrusion Detection

    No full text
    Abstract. In this paper, we describe a novel approach to policy-based intrusion detection. The model we propose checks legality of information flows between objects in the system, according to an existing security policy specification. These flows are generated by executed system operations. Illegal flows, i.e., not authorized by the security policy, are signaled and considered as intrusion symptoms. This model is able to detect a large class of attacks, referred to as “attacks by delegation ” in this paper. Since the approach focuses really on attack effects instead of attack scenarii, unknown attacks by delegation can be detected. Keywords: Policy-based intrusion detection, information flow control, access control

    Creating Objects in the Flexible Authorization Framework

    No full text
    Access control is a crucial concern to build secure IT systems and, more specifically, to protect the confidentiality of information. However, access control is necessary, but not sufficient. Actually, IT systems can manipulate data to provide services to users. The results of a data processing may disclose information concerning the objects used in the data processing itself. Therefore, the control of information flow results fundamental to guarantee data protection. In the last years many information flow control models have been proposed. However, these frameworks mainly focus on the detection and prevention of improper information leaks and do not provide support for the dynamical creation of new objects. In thi
    corecore